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OPINION
                                          
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
These consolidated appeals arise
from the imposition of an emergency
trusteeship over Local 115 of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(“IBT”) by James P. Hoffa, General
President of the IBT. The trusteeship was
imposed pursuant to Title III of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (“LMRDA”), and it resulted in the
subsequent removal of John P. Morris,
Elmore Mack and Harold Fischer as
elected officers of Local 115.  Hoffa
imposed the emergency trusteeship on
November 15, 1999.  
Morris, Mack and Fischer
(collectively referred to as the “Morris
Plaintiffs”) filed suit three days after the
trusteeship was imposed alleging that it
violated various provisions of the
LMRDA.  The essence of their complaint
was that Hoffa imposed the emergency
trusteeship in retaliation for their
opposition to Hoffa’s bid for the
presidency of the IBT in the 1996 and
1998 elections. Count One alleged that
Hoffa imposed the emergency trusteeship
for an invalid purpose in violation of Title
III of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 462, 464,
and the IBT’s Constitution.   Count Two
alleged that Hoffa violated their rights to
free speech guaranteed by Title I of the
LMRDA, specifically 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(2), and disciplined them for the
exercise of their free speech rights in
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 529.  Count Three
alleged that Hoffa breached the IBT’s
Constitution by imposing the emergency
trusteeship over Local 115 in the absence
of any colorable emergency, in violation
of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 185.  
A few days after the complaint was
3filed, the temporary trustee appointed by
Hoffa scheduled hearings as required by
the IBT’s Constitution.   At the conclusion
of the hearings, an internal union hearing
p a n e l  i s s u ed  a  R e p o r t  a n d
Recommendation finding that there was
sufficient reason for the imposition and
continuation of the trusteeship.  Hoffa
adopted the panel’s Report and
Recommendation and continued the
trusteeship on May 31, 2000.  On June 13,
2001, Hoffa dissolved the trusteeship
when newly-elected officers of the Local
were installed.
In the meantime, Hoffa filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the
district court granted in substantial part.
In its summary judgment opinion, the
district court indicated that its disposition
of Hoffa’s summary judgment motion
might warrant the entry of final judgment
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).   Accordingly,
both sides filed Rule 54(b) motions.
Hoffa also filed a motion for interlocutory
appeal of a number of issues under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).   Thereafter, the district
court entered Rule 54(b) final judgment
on Count Two (the free speech claim) in
favor of Hoffa and against the Morris
plaintiffs; entered Rule 54(b) final
judgment on Count One with respect to
the maintenance of the post-hearing
trusteeship in favor of Hoffa and against
the Morris plaintiffs, and entered Rule
54(b) final judgment on Count One with
respect to the pre-hearing emergency
trusteeship in favor of Hoffa but against
Morris only.   The district court also
certified the following question of law for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to §
1292(b): “Whether Plaintiffs have
standing to recover for any damages on
behalf of the Local Union 115 for the time
period between the November 15, 1999
emergency imposition and the General
President’s May 31, 2001 decision issued
after the hearing.”
For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on Count Two in favor
of Hoffa and against the Morris Plaintiffs.
However, we will vacate the district
court’s entry of judgment under Rule
54(b) on Count One and direct the district
court to enter summary judgment in favor
of Hoffa and against the Morris Plaintiffs
on their challenge to the prehearing
emergency trusteeship.  As we will
explain, based upon this holding, we need
not reach the issue of standing that the
district court certified for interlocutory
appeal.
I.  BACKGROUND
 The IBT is an unincorporated
association that is a labor organization
within the meaning of § 2(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),
29 U.S.C. § 152(b).   Local 115 is a
Pennsylvania unincorporated association
and a labor organization under the NLRA.
 It is also a subordinate body of the IBT
within the meaning of § 304 of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 464.  
John P. Morris was the elected
Secretary-Treasurer and principal officer
of Local 115.  Elmore Mack and Harold
Fisher were elected trustees of the local. 
4All three were members of the Executive
Board of Local 115 and constituted the
majority of that Board under the 
Local’s bylaws.   
The IBT Constitution governs the
relationship between the IBT and
subordinate Local unions such as Local
115.  James P. Hoffa was installed as
General President of the IBT in mid-
March, 1999, following a history of
turmoil that culminated in a contentious
1998 election that was conducted under
government supervision.  Morris alleges
that Hoffa initiated a campaign to oust
Morris, as well as those in Local 115 who
had been loyal to Morris, as soon as Hoffa
took over.  
On February 28, 1999, Brian Kada,
a member of Local 115, had a
conversation with Michael T. Breslin,
Frank McGuire and Billy Anderson during
which Kada told them that Hoffa had
informed James E. Smith, Jr., a Morris
foe, that Local 115 would be put under
trusteeship.  It is alleged that Kada also
said that Morris would be out of office
and that Hoffa wanted Morris’s seats on
the Philadelphia Regional Port Authority,
the Joint Council 53 and the Pennsylvania
Conference of Teamsters.   Morris claimed
that Smith would run Local 115 in return
for Smith’s assistance in ousting Morris. 
According to Morris, Gerald
McNamara had been communicating with
Hoffa as early as March 15, 1999.
McNamara was dissatisfied with Morris
and was waiting to hear if Hoffa was
going to place Local 115 in trusteeship.
Over the ensuing months, Smith and
McNamara allegedly met with IBT
representatives and agitated for a
trusteeship, with Smith complaining to
McNamara that the IBT was not moving
fast enough.   Morris claimed that Smith
had been given target dates of April 1999
and then July 1999, for creating a
trusteeship.
Hoffa and the IBT had received
numerous complaints about the abuses that
apparently characterized Local 115's
leadership, and these allegations prompted
an investigation of the local.  According to
Hoffa, information developed during that
investigation revealed a “pretty
frightening portrayal” of Local 115:
We had these stories about
beatings. Smith said he was
beaten up in a stairwell, that
Johnny Morris carries a gun,
the local was buying guns.
They had stun guns, they
had pepper spray, unusual
purchases for a local union,
and things that are improper
as far as I know, as far as I
believe and we got that
information and we acted on
it.
App. at 53.   
The investigation lead Hoffa to the
conclusion that it was necessary to impose
an emergency trusteeship over Local 115.
Accordingly, on November 14, 1999,
Hoffa  appointed Edward F. Keyser, Jr.,
5Temporary Trustee over the affairs of
Local 115, effective November 15, 1999.
That same day (November 14), Hoffa
issued a Notice to the Officers and
Members of Local 115, informing them of
the reasons for the trusteeship.   
The Notice specified sixteen
reasons that included both general and
specific instances of violence and
intimidation under Morris’s leadership
dating back to 1955 and increasing in
recent years.  The intimidation included
charges that Morris and his business
agents threatened and assaulted disloyal
members of Local 115, and that Morris
had purchased materials such as stun guns
to wage war against disloyal union
members.  Financial abuses were also
noted, including a charge that Morris
directed union members to perform
"extensive renovations and repairs on [his]
house" while still on the time clock for
their employers; that Morris required
stewards to collect cash gifts for himself in
the form of annual “Christmas gifts,” and
that he retaliated against members whose
Christmas spirit did not embrace
extortionate gift giving. The fiscal abuses
also included charges that Morris had
altered Local 115's Health and Welfare
Plan to suit his personal needs, and that he
used union funds to benefit family
members. 
The November 14th notice and
accompanying letters of appointment
resulted in Keyser being given authority
over all of the affairs of Local 115.  It also
resulted in the ouster of Morris, Mack and
Fisher from their elected positions with
the local.  On November 22, 1999, Trustee
Keyser issued a Notice of Trusteeship
Hearing pursuant to the IBT Constitution,
scheduling formal hearings on the need for
a trusteeship for Thursday, December 9,
1999, and Saturday, December 11, 1999.3
A. The Trusteeship Hearing.
According to Hoffa, a large
conference room and a smaller office were
made available to Morris’s counsel and
witnesses throughout the course of the
ensuing hearings.  Both rooms were
adjacent to the membership hearing room,
and they allowed Morris an opportunity
for consultation and preparation.   Hoffa
claimed that the hearing panel kept the
record open after the close of testimony so
that the parties or any member could
submit additional written testimony.   
Trustee Keyser presented sixteen
witnesses, including an IBT auditor and
forensic auditors.  Morris and his
supporters presented twenty-five
witnesses.   Hoffa claims that
approximately sixty members presented
information during open microphone
sessions that provided an opportunity for
any member who wanted to address the
panel to do so.  Members also presented
written statements, either directly to the
panel, or through the Trustee, and then
3 The hearings were postponed at
Morris’s request.  Ultimately, they were
rescheduled for January 5-7, 2000, and
continued through January 19-21 and
February 28 through March 3, 2000.
6turned them over to the panel.   The
proceedings were transcribed and
videotaped and both sides presented
extensive briefs and proposed findings and
conclusions of law.  
Morris argues that the IBT caused
more than 100 police officers to be placed
outside the offices where the hearings
were held.   The police included SWAT
team members in riot gear with face
masks.  People entering the offices had to
walk a “gauntlet” of masked police
officers, be searched, and pass through a
metal detector.   Morris claims that the
IBT orchestrated this scene even though
there was no indication of potential
violence from Morris’s supporters. 
Morris also claims that he was unable to
obtain any evidence to contradict the
evidence offered by Hoffa and the IBT
because the emergency Trustee had sole
possession and control of the books and
records of Local 115.  Morris alleges that
he did not know in advance whom the
Trustee would call as witnesses or what
testimony the witnesses would provide.
Ironically, Morris apparently
demonstrated his propensity for
intimidation during the hearings.  At one
point, he became enraged at Local 115
President Smith.  While Smith was
testifying, Morris gestured as if he were
loading and firing a shotgun at Smith’s
head.  This caused the hearing to adjourn
for the day.  The following day when the
hearing resumed, Morris denied making
the gesture even though his actions had
been captured on videotape. 
Morris also apparently harassed,
threatened and cursed any witness who
opposed him, and he interrupted and
talked over anyone trying to make a
statement against him.  In addition, former
Business Agent Johnson sat next to Morris
during the hearings and fulfilled the role
of one of the “tough guys” that Morris
reportedly always had with him.  While
sitting next to Morris, Johnson also
threatened and cursed witnesses and the
investigating  panel. 
The hearing panel’s Report and
Recommendation found overwhelming
evidence to support the imposition and
continuation of the trusteeship.  The panel
concluded that lifting the trusteeship
would result in substantial damage to
Local 115 and its members because Morris
had created a climate of fear and
intimidation that was irreparably
destroying the rights of the membership.
B.  The IBT’s Findings.
Hoffa accepted the panel’s
recommendation and continued the
trusteeship.  In doing so he wrote: 
During the eleven days of
hearings,  the longest
running hearing ever
conducted by the [IBT],
n u m e r o u s  m e m b e r s
appeared to testify about the
events in the Local.  Much
of that testimony revealed a
persistent pattern of abuse
of power and suppression of
membership rights.  Quite
simply,  the evidence
7established that supporters
of the John Morris
administration received
special  benefi t s and
attention and those members
who spoke or acted in a
manner viewed as being
hostile to the administration
were abused, intimidated,
retaliated against and even
physically and economically
endangered.
App. at 10.  
Hoffa found evidence of several
violent, verbal and physical attacks by
Morris and other Local 115 officials
against staff as well as union members.
Morris had conducted abusive inquisitions
and threatened union stewards.  For
example, union member Kada had been
“sucker-punched” in the face by Business
Agent “Jocko” Johnson on union property
during a union meeting, in full view of
Morris.  Morris had then pushed Kada and
baited Kada to push him back.4
The record contained substantial
evidence of financial malpractice by
Morris that Morris neither refuted nor
explained.  Morris used millions of dollars
of Local 115's money to purchase and
improve real estate, to purchase printing
equipment, buses, a snowplow and
vehicles that had no benefit to the
members.  Testimony from IBT auditor
William Evans and forensic auditors
Robert Walker and Joseph Wahl
established that Morris purposefully failed
to maintain required accounting records in
order to hide much of his financial
mismanagement.  In addition, Morris
falsified bank documents, commingled
money from various Local 115 Funds and
failed to file necessary tax documents.   
Morris improperly used his
authority to maintain control of Local 115.
He placed members and their relatives in
jobs and demanded loyalty in return for
keeping their jobs.  The members so
placed were reportedly fired if Morris
thought that they were disloyal to him. In
addition, Morris arranged late night
meetings where union members were
abused, threatened and, in one instance,
assaulted.  Hoffa concluded that the
officers of Local 115 did not properly
represent these members.5
4Morris’s demeanor was often
beyond bounds attributable to normal
anger.  He  allegedly reinforced the
intimidation by carrying a gun in the
office in violation of the IBT Constitution.
5The trustee’s evidence established
a complete breakdown of democratic rule
within Local 115, and much of this
evidence was almost entirely unrefuted.
Morris did not deny requiring union
members to do personal work for him or
his relatives while they were “on the
clock.” Rather, he insisted that his position
on the Joint Council entitled him to such
services.  In fact as noted above, it was
corroborated by Morris’s own conduct
during the very hearings that were
8The evidence also demonstrated
that Morris had violated the IBT
Constitution and federal law by
consistently refusing to provide union
members with copies of their collective
bargaining agreements.6  
The evidence confirmed that
Morris had used the guise of “Christmas
gifts” to extort money from members at
some of the higher paying union shops as
Hoffa had previously heard.  Documents
established that Morris had been
embezzling money from the Union since
1981 when he awarded himself a raise
without the required Executive Board
approval.  At the end of 1989, Morris
further enriched himself by causing the
Union to take out an insurance policy on
his life under false pretenses.
Hoffa concluded that this evidence




As noted above, the Morris
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the district
court against Hoffa and the IBT
challenging the imposition of the
emergency trusteeship days after it was
imposed.7   In essence, the plaintiffs
alleged that Hoffa imposed the trusteeship
because they opposed him in the 1996 and
1998 IBT presidential elections.  They
claimed that Hoffa was attempting to
suppress such opposition in the future.8 As
summarized above, Count One alleged
that the trusteeship violated Title III of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 462, 464, and the
investigating claims of dictatorial control
of Local 115.
6 Members who attempted to
participate in the preparation of proposals
prior to contract negotiations were told to
“shut up.”  
7Originally, Kenneth Woodring, a
union officer affected by the imposition of
the trusteeship, was a plaintiff.  However,
he moved to dismiss all of his claims
against Hoffa and the IBT pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1).
8Morris claimed that Hoffa, an
attorney, who until 1993 was never
affiliated with the IBT, left the practice of
law in that year to become the
administrative assistant to the President of
Teamsters Joint Council 43 for the sole
purpose of running for the office of the
General President of the IBT.   Hoffa
made his first unsuccessful attempt at the
IBT’s Presidency in 1996.  Morris
supported a slate opposed to Hoffa during
1996 election.    
During the 1998 elections, Morris
once again supported a slate opposed to
Hoffa.   Morris alleged that on May 3,
1998, William Walker, Sr., a retired
Teamster and a Hoffa supporter, attended
a Hoffa campaign fundraiser in Essington,
Pennsylvania.   Walker asked Hoffa what
he intended to do about Morris if Hoffa
was elected.   According to Morris,
Hoffa’s reply was: “He’s the first f....r to
go when I get in.”   
9IBT Constitution; Count Two alleged that
Hoffa violated plaintiffs’ right to free
speech as guaranteed by Title I of the
LMRDA, specifically, 29 U.S.C. §§
411(a)(2), and § 29; and Count Three
alleged that Hoffa breached the contract
between the Local and the IBT, i.e., the
IBT Constitution, by imposing the
emergency trusteeship over Local 115 in
the absence of any colorable emergency.
Count Three further alleged that this also
violated the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. 
The plaintiffs sought various forms of
injunctive relief, compensatory and
punitive damages, and fees and costs.9  
Hoffa filed an answer and a
counterclaim.  In his counterclaim, he
requested judicial confirmation of the
trusteeship under 29 U.S.C. § 464(c).10
Following additional discovery, the
district court granted Hoffa’s motion for
summary judgment in substantial part.  In
doing so, the court indicated that entry of
final judgment qualifying for appeal
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) might be
warranted.  Morris v. Hoffa, 2001 WL
1231741 (E.D.Pa. October 12, 2001). 
Following the court’s thoughtful lead,
Hoffa thereafter filed a motion for final
judgment under Rule 54(b) and for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b).  Morris filed a motion for final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) the same
day.  
On December 28, 1999, the district
court granted Morris’ motion for
preliminary injunction, enjoining Hoffa
and the IBT from exercising trusteeship
over Local 115 and ordering Hoffa and
the IBT to return control over Local 115
to its duly elected officers.   The district
court concluded that the information
available to Hoffa and the IBT was
insufficient to provide Hoffa and the IBT
with a good faith belief that an emergency
existed sufficient to warrant the imposition
of an emergency trusteeship.  Morris v.
Hoffa, 1999 WL 1285820 (E.D.Pa. Dec.
28, 1999).  Hoffa and the IBT appealed
and this court stayed the injunction
pending the appeal.  During the pendency
of the appeal, the IBT conducted the
internal union hearing regarding the
necessity for a trusteeship.  As noted
above, Hoffa, thereafter continued the
t r u s t ee s h i p  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e
recommendation of the hearing panel.  On
June 12, 2000, we dismissed the appeal as
moot because the internal union hearing
had been conducted and Hoffa had ruled
on the propriety of a trusteeship.  Morris v.
Hoffa, 2000 WL 33727939 (3d Cir. June
12, 2000).   
On January 7, 2002, the district
court entered final judgment on Count
Two (the free speech count) in favor of
Hoffa and against all plaintiffs; entered
final judgment on Count One with respect
to the maintenance of the post-hearing
9 The plaintiffs concede that the
dissolution of the trusteeship on June 13,
2001 mooted the equitable relief sought in
Counts One and Three.
10Hoffa concedes that the
dissolution of the trusteeship moots his
counterclaim.
10
trusteeship in favor of Hoffa and against
Morris, Mack and Fischer; entered final
judgment on Count One with respect to
the emergency pre-hearing trusteeship in
favor of Hoffa and against Morris only.
As we noted at the outset, the court also
certified the following question of law for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to §
1292(b):
Whether Plaintiffs have
standing to recover any
damages on behalf of the
Local Union 115 for the
time period between the
November  15 ,  1999
emergency imposition and
the General President’s May
31, 2000 decision issued
after the hearing.
 Morris v. Hoffa, 2002 WL 15900 at *7
(E.D.Pa. Jan. 4, 2002).11  
Both the Morris Plaintiffs and
Hoffa filed timely appeals.  
III. DISCUSSION
A. The LMRDA
The LMRDA “was enacted [in
1959] in response to the perceived abuses
that plagued labor relations and
undermined public confidence in the labor
movement.”  Becker v. Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of
America, AFL-CI0, 900 F.2d 761, 766
(4th Cir. 1990).  The legislation was an
attempt to respond to abuses within the
organized labor movement while
“minimizing governmental interference
with the internal affairs of labor
organizations.”  Id.  at 766-767.  “Thus,
while substantive abuses were to be
addressed, the McClellan Committee
recommended that any corrective
legislation insure union democracy.”  Id.
at 767 (citation and internal quotations
omitted).12
Congress enacted Title III of the
LMRDA to address problems related to
imposition of trusteeships over local
unions.  Id.13 In doing so, Congress was
concerned with past abuses related to
imposition of trusteeships, but it was also
aware that “trusteeships are effective
devices for maintaining order within labor
organizations[]”.  Id.  Thus, “the goals of
the [LMRDA] were to be accomplished
without emasculating the trusteeship as a
11The district court denied Hoffa’s
motion for § 1292(b) certification as to all
other issues.  Id.
12 The Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor
Management Field that was responsible
for investigating abuses in organized labor
and recommending remedial legislation is
often referred to as the “McClellan
Committee,” after Senator McClellan, the
Committee’s chair.
13The legislative history of Title III
is recited in detail in our opinion in Ross v.
Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, 266 F.3d
236, 245-249 (3d Cir. 2001).  
11
control device.”14  Id.  
The LMRDA mandates that any
trusteeship that is imposed conform to the
constitution and bylaws of the union, and
the purposes for which the trusteeship is
imposed must be legitimate.  Id.  More
particularly, § 302 of Title III of the
LMRDA provides:
Trusteeships shall be
e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d
administered by a labor
organiza tion over  a
subordinate body only in
accordance with the
constitution and bylaws of
the organization which has
assumed trusteeship over
the subordinate body and
for  the  purpose of
correcting corruption or
financial malpractice,
assuring the performance of
col lect ive bargaining
agreements or other duties
o f  a  b a r g a i n i n g
representative, restoring
democratic procedures, or
otherwise carrying out the
legitimate objects of such
labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 462.  Given the countless
circumstances that might give rise to a
trusteeship, “Congress specifically
declined to attempt to detail all of the
legitimate reasons for which a trusteeship
might be imposed, leaving for the courts
the development of common law limiting
principles.”  Becker, 900 F.2d at 767-768
(citations omitted).
Congress also recognized that
second guessing the judgments
culminating in trusteeships could be both
difficult and impractical.   Accordingly, a
presumption of validity attaches to
trusteeships that are imposed for limited
duration and in a manner  consistent with
the procedural mandates of the LMRDA.
Id. at 768 (“Recognizing the delicate
judgments which international officers are
called upon to make in imposing a
trusteeship and conscious of the relative
inexpertness of outsiders, the [LMRDA’s]
guideline for evaluating a trusteeship
supplies a presumption of validity, limited
in duration, when certain procedural
requirements are met.”) (citation omitted).
Title III of the LMRDA also provides:
In any proceeding pursuant
to this section a trusteeship
established by a labor
14It has been noted that “[w]hile
trusteeships are normally used by national
unions to prevent or eliminate
malpractices in subordinate organizations
and as a tool of efficient union
administration, they can be, and have
been, used as a tool by which national
officers suppress local autonomy over
union activities.”  J.D. Jolly v. Gorman,
428 F.2d 960, 966 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing
Levitan, The Federal Law of Union
Trusteeship, in Symposium, Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (Slovekno, 1959)).  
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organization in conformity
with  the  procedural
r e q u irements  o f  i t s
constitution and bylaws and
authorized or ratified after
a fair hearing either before
the executive board or
before such other body as
may be provided in
accordance with  i t s
constitution or bylaws shall
be presumed valid for a
period of eighteen months
from the date of its
establishment and shall not
be subject to attack during
such period except upon
clear and convincing proof
that the trusteeship was
established or maintained in
good faith for a purpose
allowable under section 462
of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (italics added).
A “fair hearing” requires notice and
an opportunity to defend.  Becker, 900
F.2d at 768.15  “[T]he notice should set out
in writing the factual basis for alleged
violations of law or the union’s
constitution that justify imposition of a
trusteeship.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “The
notice should also provide the date, time,
and location of the hearing and indicate
that the local will have the opportunity to
respond to the charges.”  Id.  (citation
omitted).  Courts do not, however, require
any particular form of notice as long as the
notice, together with any written
communications supplementing it, inform
those concerned of the date and time of
the hearing. Id. 
The international union seeking to
impose the trusteeship must present
sufficient evidence to justify a trusteeship
at the hearing, and “[t]he local must be
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine
the international’s witnesses and present
rebuttal evidence.”  Id. at 769 (citations
omitted).16  
B.  The Morris/Mack/Fischer Appeal
(No. 02-1401)
The Morris Plaintiffs argue that the
IBT failed to conduct the fair hearing
required to ratify and continue the
trusteeship. They also claim that the
trusteeship is little more than Hoffa’s
illegal retaliation for the exercise of their
speech. We will discuss each claim
15“Under the common law prior to
the passage of the LMRDA, a trusteeship
imposed upon a subordinate body was
invalid unless the subordinate body was
granted a fair hearing.”  J.D. Jolly v.
Gorman, 428 F.2d at 967.
16Lack of counsel does not make a
trusteeship hearing unfair because there is
no right to representation by counsel at
such a hearing.  See, e.g., Transport
Workers Union of Phila. Local v.
Transport Workers Union of Amer., AFL-
CIO, 2000 WL 1521507 at *2 (E.D.Pa.
Sept. 29, 2000).  
13
separately.
(I).  Did The IBT Conduct a Fair
Hearing
to Ratify and Continue the
Trusteeship (Count One)?
The district court concluded that
the Morris Plaintiffs failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact as to the
unfairness of the hearing.  Accordingly,
the district court held that the post-hearing
trusteeship met the requirements of 29
U.S.C. § 464(c) and was therefore entitled
to a presumption of validity which went
unrebutted.  2001 WL 1231741 at *6.   
The district court considered
allegations that the trusteeship was
imposed in bad faith and for an improper
purpose in violation of § 462.   The court
first concluded as a matter of law that a
trusteeship is permissible if supported by
a single proper purpose even if an
improper purpose is also alleged.17  Id. at
*7.   The court then considered the
numerous justifications the hearing panel
found that supported Hoffa’s decision to
continue the trusteeship.  Id.
Consequently, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Hoffa and
against The Morris Plaintiffs on Count
One with respect to the post-hearing
maintenance of trusteeship.  
The court viewed Count One as
asserting two separate claims – a pre-
hearing emergency trusteeship claim and
a post-hearing maintenance trusteeship
claim.   2002 WL 15900 at *3 n.5.  The
court denied summary judgment to Hoffa
on the pre-hearing emergency trusteeship
claim because it believed a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether the
emergency trusteeship was initially
imposed in accordance with the IBT
constitution.  2001 WL 1231741 at *4.   
However, because Morris was no
longer a member of Local 115 when the
district court disposed of Hoffa’s summary
judgment motions, the court found that he
lacked standing to challenge the pre-
hearing emergency trusteeship because
any such claim would be limited to
damages suffered by the Local.  2002 WL
15900 at *3 (citing Ross v. Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees
International Union, 266 F.3d 236, 249-
50 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Accordingly, the
district court granted summary judgment
to Hoffa only as against Morris on the pre-
hearing emergency trusteeship claim.
Mack and Fischer, although no longer
elected officials of Local 115, are still
members of the Local.  The district court
certified the issue of their standing to
pursue a damage claim on the Local’s
behalf for interlocutory appeal under §
1292(b). (No. 02-2214).  
Mack and Fischer do not contest
the district court’s ruling that a single
proper purpose is sufficient to justify a
17As noted, the alleged improper
purpose was Hoffa’s alleged vendetta
against Morris, Mack and Fischer for their
opposition to Hoffa in the 1996 and 1998
elections.
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trusteeship even where improper purposes
are alleged.   Similarly, they do not
attempt to refute the hearing panel’s
factual findings that there were numerous
proper purposes for ratifying and
continuing the trusteeship.18   Rather, as
we distill their argument, they appear to be
claiming that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Hoffa and the
ITB conducted a fair hearing to ratify and
continue the trusteeship.  
Initially, they claim that the hearing
was unfair because its outcome was
predetermined.   According to Mack and
Fischer: 
It is uncontroverted . . . that
as of February 23, 1999, an
agreement existed among
supporters of James E.
Smith, Jr., and Hoffa.
Hoffa would use his
authori ty as general
president of the IBT to
impose a trusteeship upon
Local 115, in exchange for
which Smith, as ultimate
successor to Morris, would
permit Hoffa to control
Local 115's seats on the
Philadelphia Regional Port
Authority, the Joint Council
and the Pennsylvania
Conference.
Appellants’ Br. (No. 02-1401), at 14-15. 
They then argue that the district court
held, in its preliminary injunction hearing,
that Morris was likely to establish at trial
that the information available to Hoffa
when he imposed the emergency
trusteeship was not sufficient to provide a
good faith belief in the existence of an
emergency.  See 1999 WL 1285820 at
*10.  Thus, they claim that an inference
can be drawn that Hoffa “would control
the process of the hearing to ensure his
desired outcome.”  Appellants’ Br. (No.
02-1401), at 15.  Accordingly, they
maintain that the district court’s failure to
“submit this dispute to a factfinder
constitutes reversible error.”  Id. at 16.
We disagree.19  
At the outset, the district court’s
grant of preliminary injunctive relief
enjoining the imposition of the emergency
trusteeship was not a merits disposition.
18The reasons for the continuation
of the trusteeship included: “refusal to
provide members of the Local with copies
of their collective bargaining agreements;
intimidation and physical attacks on
members; financial abuse. . . missing
assets; extortion of Christmas cash gifts;
compelling members of the Local to do
work that benefitted Morris and his
relatives personally; and engineering of
the termination of jobs of Local members
who were perceived as disloyal.”  2001
WL 1231741 at *7. 
19We exercise plenary review of the
district court’s grant of summary
judgment.  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc.
v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d
144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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“[A] decision on a preliminary injunction
is, in effect, only a prediction about the
merits of the case.”  United States v. Local
560, IBT, 974 F.2d 315, 330 (3d Cir.
1992).  Therefore, “a trial court, in
deciding whether to grant permanent
relief, is not bound by its decision or the
appellate court’s decision about
preliminary relief.”  Id.   Rather, the trial
court “is free to reconsider the merits of
the case.”  Id.   Consequently, the district
court’s grant of preliminary injunctive
relief does not suggest a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to  preclude the
grant of summary judgment.   
Moreover, Mack and Fischer do not
contest the district court’s holding that the
existence of a single proper purpose for
the imposition of a trusteeship establishes
the validity of the trusteeship, even where
improper motives may exist. Thus, even if
we assume arguendo that a Hoffa-Morris
vendetta motivated Hoffa’s efforts to oust
Morris, Mack and Fischer from Local 115,
we are still left with the district court’s
conclusion that the hearing panel found
numerous proper justifications for
imposing the trusteeship.  Reasons, by the
way, which Mack and Fischer do not even
begin to dispute.
Moreover, the record does not
support any connection between the
alleged Morris-Hoffa vendetta, the
imposition of a trusteeship and the
allegation that Hoffa rewarded Smith with
the presidency of Local 115.  In their
brief, Mack and Fischer argue that:
the evidentiary record
further establishes that
Hoffa and the IBT
conspired with James Smith
to create an excuse to
institute a trusteeship.  In
exchange for his assistance
in ousting Morris, Smith
was promised control over
Local 115, and sure enough,
that is exactly what
happened.
Appellants’ Br. (No. 02-1401), at 23. 
However, this claim ignores the fact that
Smith was elected by secret ballot of the
membership in an open and fair election.
As noted above, Local 115 conducted
elections for officers while this litigation
was pending. A majority of the voting
members, not Hoffa, chose Smith to be
president of the Local.  And, Hoffa alleges
without contradiction that he played no
role in the election.  Hoffa’s Br. at 23. 
Accordingly, we fail to see how an
allegation that Hoffa promised Smith the
presidency could defeat Hoffa’s motion
for summary judgment.  While Mack and
Fischer  assert this “uncontroverted”
agreement that Hoffa would make Smith
the head of Local 115 in exchange for
Smith’s cooperation in ousting Morris,
they concede that there is no record
evidence that any such deal existed.
Rather, their assertion rests on a rather
ethereal inference.  See Appellants’ Br.
(02-1401), at 7 n.3 (“Whether or not Hoffa
actually promised Smith control over
Local 115, as Brian Kada suggested [in
the Breslin Declaration], is not established
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on the record below; however it is
reasonable to infer that Smith received
such a promise”). (Emphasis added).  
In any event, the Morris Plaintiffs
appear to retreat from their claim that the
outcome of  any hearing  was
predetermined and instead now present
two reasons for concluding that the
hearing was unfair.  First, they claim that
they were unable to present an effective
case and cross-examine witnesses because
they did not have full access to Local
115's books and records. They claim that
the books and records were in the custody
and control of the Trustee after the
imposition of the emergency trusteeship.
Thus, they could not know which
witnesses the Trustee would call each day
at the hearing.   Second, they argue that
the police presence outside the union hall
where the hearing was held was “per se
intimidation, even for Teamsters,”  that
biased the panel members by sending “a
very clear message” to the panel that the
charges had merit.20  Appellants’ Br. (No.
02-1401), at 17-18.
However, Mack and Fischer have
waived their right to make these two
arguments on appeal because they did not
raise them in the district court.  Rather, as
the district court explained, the challenge
to the fairness of the hearing was based on
a claim that “(1) heavy police presence
inhibited members from testifying;21 and
(2) [Morris, Mack and Fischer] were not
allowed to have the assistance of counsel
during the hearing.”22  2001 WL 1231741
20Plaintiffs claim that the IBT’s
website reported: “Outside the hall, more
than 100 law enforcement officers were on
hand to ensure that the hearing proceeded
without violence instigated by Morris
supporters.” Appellants’ Br. (No. 02-
1401), at 9 (citation omitted).  They also
say: “The IBT brought in these police
officers, including armed police and
SWAT team officers assisted by
sharpshooters, canine officers and officers
mounted on horseback.  The police
officers were clad in black riot gear, with
face masks.  Persons entering the union
hall had to walk a gauntlet of dozens of
masked officers lined up in two columns,
being searched and passing through a
medical detectors.”  Id. (citation and
internal quotations omitted).  Mack and
Fischer argue that the IBT caused this
heavy police presence even though there
was no indication for a potential for
violence by Morris’s supporters.
Appellants’ Br. (N002-1401) at 17-18.  
21The district court held that the
presence of police security at the site of
the hearing did not by itself render the
hearing unfair.  2001 WL 1251741 at *6
(citing Chapa v. Local 18, 737 F.2d 929,
933 (11th Cir. 1984).  
22The district court held that there is
no right to counsel at a trusteeship
hearing.  2001 WL 1231741 at *6, and
that is not contested on appeal.
Furthermore, it appears from the
transcripts of the hearing that Morris,
Mack and Fischer were represented by
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at *6 (emphasis added).  As a general
rule, “absent compelling circumstances an
appellate court will not consider issues
that are raised for the first time on appeal.”
Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 929
(3d Cir. 1984), overruled on other
grounds recognized in Carter v. Rafferty,
826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 19987).   Here,
Mack and Fischer do not suggest any such
compelling circumstances and we can
think of none.
(ii). IBT’s Retaliation for Engaging  in
Protected Speech.
In Count Two of their complaint,
the Morris Plaintiffs alleged that Hoffa
violated their rights to free speech under
the Title I of the LMRDA,23 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(2), and disciplined them for the
exercise of those rights in violation of 29
U.S.C. § 529. 
Section 101(a)(2) of Title I of the
LMRDA provides:
Every member of any labor
organization shall have the
right to meet and assemble
freely with other members;
and to express any views,
arguments, or opinions; and
to express at meetings of the
labor organization his
views, upon candidates in
an election of a labor
organization or upon any
business properly before the
meeting, subject to the
organization’s established
and reasonable rules
pertaining to the conduct of
meetings: Provided, That
nothing herein shall be
construed to impair the right
of a labor organization to
a d o p t  a n d  e n f o r c e
reasonable rules as to the
responsibility of every
member toward  th e
o r g a n i z a ti o n  a s  a n
institution and to his
refraining from conduct that
would interfere with its
performance of its legal or
contractual obligations.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).  Section 102 of
Title I, 29 U.S.C. § 412,  provides that any
person whose rights have been infringed
by a violation of § 101 may bring an
action in the district court seeking such
relief as may be appropriate.   Section 609
of Title VI of the LMRDA prohibits
certain kinds of discipline of a union
member.  It provides:
It shall be unlawful for any
labor organization, or any
officer, agent, shop steward,
or other representative of a
counsel who participated in the hearing. 
Hoffa’s Appendix, at 103-105.
23Title I of the LMRDA is referred
to as the “Member’s Bill of Rights.”  See
Farrell v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of America (Airline Division), 888
F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1989).  
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labor organization, or any
employee thereof to fine,
suspend, expel or otherwise
discipline any of its
members for exercising any
right to which he is entitled
under the provision of this
chapter.  The provisions of
section 412 of this title shall
be applicable in the
enforcement of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 529.
In their appeal from the grant of
summary judgment on Count Two, the
Morris Plaintiffs argue that the district
court erred by holding that “as a matter of
law, a  determination that a presumption
of validity attached to the continuation of
a trusteeship pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
464(c), precludes the violation of an
individual union member’s rights under 29
U.S.C. §§ 411 and 529.”  Appellants’ Br.
(02-1401), at 1 (emphasis in original).  
However, that is not what the
district court held.   Rather, the district
court held that the Morris Plaintiffs’
nominal Title I claims were really a
challenge to the validity of the trusteeship
that must therefore be brought under Title
III.  The district court correctly
characterized the Title I claims as follows:
Plaintiffs allege that
"Defendants' imposition of a
purported 'emergency'
trusteeship over Local 115
was carried out in bad faith,
as a political reprisal against
the members of Local 115
for their vigorous electoral
opposition to Hoffa's
candidacy for General
President and his policies."
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specifically to suppress the
o p p o s i t i o n p o l i c i e s ,
electoral activities and
dissent of Plaintiff Morris
and the Plaintiff elected
members of the Local 115
Executive Board, to the
policies and administration
of Defendant Hoffa and the




Local 115 to undermine the
credibility of the expected
trial testimony of Plaintiffs
Morris, Woodring and other
members of Local 115 ..."
(Compl. ¶ 60 (emphasis
a d d e d ) ) ;  a n d  t h a t
"Defendants have imposed
the trusteeship upon Local
115 in order to retaliate
against the members of
Local 115 and its elected
officers, the Plaintiffs, for
their past and current




(Compl. ¶ 61 (emphasis
added).) Plaintiffs expressly
cast their Title I claim as
one "challenging the
unlawful imposition of a
trusteeship, not the job
terminations of Plaintiffs."
(Pls.' Mem. at 44- 45.)
2001 WL 1231741 at *10 (italics in
original).  The district court held that the
claim was, in reality, “just another way of
saying that the trusteeship was invalid
because it was imposed for an improper
motive.”  Id.  The court then relied upon
the reasoning in Farrell v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of America
(Airline Division), 888 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.
1989), in finding that challenges to the
validity of a trusteeship must be raised
under Title III, not Title I.24 
Consequently, the district court granted
summary judgment to Hoffa on the Count
Two claim.
For reasons not apparent to us, the
Morris Plaintiffs do not address the district
court’s rationale for granting summary
judgment to Hoffa on their Title I claim.
In fact, they do not even mention that the
district court dismissed their Title I claim
as nothing more than a Title III attack on
the validity of the trusteeship.  Instead,
they argue that their removal as officials
of Local 115 for engaging in protected
free speech constitutes retaliatory
discipline in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 529.
See Appellants’ Br. (No. 02-1401),  at 21
(“[R]emoval from union office for the
exercise of protected speech. . .constitutes
improper retaliatory discipline in violation
of 29 U.S.C. § 529.”) (emphasis added). 
Even if we assume arguendo that
Morris, Mack and Fischer were all
engaging in protected speech and also
assume that they were disciplined for
doing so, their claim can still not survive
our holding in Sheridan v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
24In Farrell, flight attendants
claimed that the international union’s
imposition of a trusteeship immediately
after they created their own local violated
their Title I right to vote in local elections.
 However, they did not challenge the
validity of the trusteeship under Title III.
The court of appeals found that the flight
attendants could not claim violation of
their Title I rights by means of a
trusteeship without first addressing the
validity of the trusteeship under in an
action under Title III.  The court wrote:
“Title III, not Title I, provides these
appellants with their appropriate remedy.
A determination of the validity vel non of
the trusteeship must precede any
determination of the appellants’ rights to
hold local elections.  If the trusteeship is a
fraud, the statute provides a mechanism to
prove it and thereafter recover their Title
III rights.  But, let them not put the cart
before the horse.”  888 F.2d at 462.   
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America, Local No. 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d
Cir. 1962).  There we held that neither
Title I nor Section 609 of Title VI (29
U.S.C. § 529) provide a remedy to a
business agent who was removed from
elected office prior to the expiration of his
term.  We stated that “[i]t is the union-
member relationship, not the union-officer
or union-employee relationship, that is
protected.”  Id. at 157.   We elaborated
upon this in Harrison v. Local 54 of the
American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, 518 F.2d 1276 (3d
Cir. 1975):
The union member is free to
express views, arguments or
opinions on matters of
union business even if the
expressions are libelous or
malicious without fear of
discipline.  Conversely, the
LMRDA does not provide
relief to a union officer for
suspension as an officer, nor
for loss of income resulting
therefrom. Nor does the Act
p rov ide re l i ef  f rom
wrongful termination from
employment.  What is
protected is the union-
membership relationship.
518 F.2d at 1281 (3d Cir. 1975).  Title I of
the LMRDA therefore affords no remedy
for any damages resulting from plaintiffs’
removal as officers of Local 115.  
The Morris Plaintiffs attempt to
undermine this reasoning by arguing that
the majority of appellate courts  have held
that retaliatory removal from union office
for exercising Title I free speech rights
violates 29 U.S.C. § 529.  Appellants’ Br
(No. 01-1401). at 21 (citing Bradford v.
Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
Local 1093, 563 F.2d 1138, 1141-1142
(4th Cir. 1977) (collecting cases and
criticizing Sheridan)).   They also argue
that Sheridan “does not represent the
[current] position of this court.”
Appellants’ Br (No. 02-1401). at 22 n.7. 
However, Sheridan has been
followed in Martire v. Laborers’ Local
Union 1058, 410 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir.
1969), Harrison v. Local 54, 518 F.2d at
1281, and, most recently, in Ruocchio v.
United Transportation Union, Local 60,
181 F.3d 376, 381 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Moreover, because Sheridan is the law of
this circuit it controls our analysis
notwithstanding any conflicting authority
from other Circuit Courts of Appeals. See
Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.32d 854,
855, n.2 (3rd Cir. 1996) (“It is the tradition
of this court that a holding of a panel in a
reported opinion is binding on subsequent
panels.).
Nonetheless, a caveat is in order.
In Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982),
the Supreme Court concluded that the
language of §§  411(a)(1) and (2) as well
as Title I’s legislative history established
“that it was rank-and-file union members
– not union officers or employees, as such
– whom Congress sought to protect.”  Id.
at 437.   In dong so, the Court approvingly
cited our decision in Sheridan.  Id. at 438.
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However, about seven years after
Finnegan, the Court held in  Sheet Metal
Workers’ International Association v.
Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989), that the
removal of an elected business agent did
violate Title I’s free speech provisions.
The Court distinguished between the
removal of an appointed business agent, as
occurred in Finnegan, and the removal of
an elected business agent.  The Court
noted that when an elected official is
removed from office, the membership is
deprived of its representative of choice.
Id. at 355.   “[T]he potential chilling effect
on Title I free speech rights is more
pronounced when elected officials are
discharged.   Not only is the fired official
likely to be chilled in the exercise of his
own free speech rights, but so are the
members who voted for him.”  Id. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the
retaliatory removal of an elected official
can be actionable under Title I.   The
Court also held that the removed official
was not precluded from bringing a Title I
action because he had been removed
during a Title III trusteeship. Id. at 356
(“[W]e find nothing in the language of the
LMRDA or its legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended Title I
rights to fall by the wayside whenever a
trusteeship is imposed.’).   
However, for reasons that are not
apparent to us, the Morris Plaintiffs (who
were elected officials of Local 115) do not
rely upon Sheet Metal Workers to support
their argument that their removal from
elected office was improper retaliation in
violation of their Title I free speech rights.
 Moreover, the district court did not grant
summary judgment to Hoffa on Count
Two on the basis of Sheridan.  Rather, as
noted above, Hoffa was granted summary
judgment because the district court held
that plaintiffs’ nominal Title I action was
really a Title III challenge to the
imposition of the trusteeship.   The Morris
Plaintiffs do not even discuss that issue.
They do not even mention the Court’s
decision in Sheet Metal Workers.
Therefore, we need not inquire into the
impact, if any, that Sheet Metal Workers
has on the continued validity of our
holding in  Sheridan.25
25Our decision in Ross v. Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees
Int’l Union, 266 F.3d 236, 257 (3d Cir.
2001), precludes the recovery of personal
damages under Title III of the LMRDA by
an appointed full-time salaried employee
of a union flowing from the termination of
his/her appointed employment. “Relief
under [Title III] must be sought on behalf
of the local union organization and the
entire union membership must reap the
benefits.”  Id.   As noted in n.15, supra,
the district court, on the basis of Ross,
found that because Morris was no longer
a union member, he could not pursue a
damages claim on behalf of the Local for
any damages the Local suffered as a result
of the imposition of the pre-hearing
emergency trusteeship.  The district court
further held that Ross precluded Mack and
Fischer, who unlike Morris, were still
union members, from asserting a claim for
personal damages under Title III.  2002
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  B.  The Hoffa § 1292(b) Interlocutory
Appeal
(No. 02-2214).
We have already noted that the
district court viewed the Count One
challenge to the imposition of the
trusteeship as two separate claims – a
“pre-hearing emergency trusteeship” claim
and a “post-hearing maintenance
trusteeship” claim – and granted summary
judgment to Hoffa on the post-hearing
claim while denying summary judgment
on the pre-hearing claim.  The district
court explained:
This Court has previously
c o n c l u d e d ,  a t  t h e
preliminary injunction
stage, that the evidence
demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of proving that
the information available to
Hoffa at the time he decided
to impose the emergency
trusteeship was insufficient
to provide him with a good
faith belief in the existence
of an emergency. This
evidence creates a genuine
issue of material fact under
Rule 56 as to whether Hoffa
imposed the emergency
trusteeship in accordance
with the IBT constitution. If
Plaintiffs establish at trial
that Defendants' imposition
o f  t h e  e m e r g e n c y
trusteeship suffered from
this procedural deficiency,
Plaintiffs would then have
the opportunity to proceed
on the damages claim for
the period between the
defective imposition of the
emergency trusteeship on
November 15, 1999, and
Hoffa's May 31, 2000
decision, based on the post
hoc hearing, to continue the
trusteeship.  Accordingly,
the Court denies the motion
for summary judgment as to
the emergency trusteeship
period from November 15,
1999 to May 31, 2000.
2001 WL 1231741 at *4.   The district
court then limited any recovery to the
damages suffered by Local 115.  The court
explained:
Plaintiffs have not yet
specified the nature of the
compensatory damages
sought under Title III.
Plaintiffs may not, however,
collect any personal
WL 15900 at *6.  However, it also held
that Ross did not address the issue of
Mack’s and Fischer’s standing to recover
damages on behalf of Local 115 from the
imposition of the pre-hearing emergency
trusteeship.  Id.   Consequently, it certified
that issue for interlocutory appeal.  Id. 
23
damages for lost wages, loss
of position, or any other
individual damages on this
portion of the Title III
claim. The potential damage
recovery on a Title III claim
is limited to damages to the
local union itself. See Ross
v. Hotel Employees &
Restaurant Employees Int'l
Union, [266 F.3d 236 (3d
Cir. 2001)]. The Court does
not reach the question of
Plaintiffs' entitlement to
such damages on behalf of
the local union.26
26 Mack and Fischer appear to
concede that they have yet to identify the
nature of the damages they seek on behalf
of Local 115.   They argue that because
Ross was decided during the pendency of
the summary judgment proceedings, the
“nature and quantum of damages is not
part of the record on the motion for
summary judgment.”  Appellees’ Br. (No.
02-2214), at 13.  Nonetheless, they assert
that “the court [of appeals] can reasonably
infer the nature, if not the quantum, of
damages to Local 115 and its membership
generally.”  Id. 
However, it is not our function to
“infer the nature” of their damages.
Moreover, when Mack and Fischer do
refer to their damages,  it is clear that they
are claiming personal Title I damages, not
Title III damages to the local.  For
example, they quote the following from
Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assn., 488 U.S.
at 355; “the potential chilling effect of
Title I free speech rights is more
pronounced when elected officials are
discharged.  Not only is the fired official
likely to be chilled in the exercise of his
own free speech rights, but so are the
members who voted for him.”  Appellees’
Br. (O2-2214), at 13.   As another
example, Mack and Fischer say the
question of whether the manner in which
Hoffa imposed the emergency trusteeship
“resulted in a chilling effect on the
membership of Local 115, and the extent
of the damages sustained by the
membership of Local 115 as a result
thereof, is a question that is best left in the
hands of the finder of fact.”  Id. at 15.  
 Admittedly, Mack and Fischer do
make an allegation of appropriate Title III
damages in a footnote in their brief. 
There they state:
Title III damages in the case
at bar involve, inter alia,
transfer of at least one union
shop organized by Local
115 to Teamsters Local 500,
the Local of emergency
trustee Edward J. Keyser,
Jr., in exchange for his
support.  The membership
fees of the transferred union
shop are significant enough
to justify the continued
existence of Local 500,
which was suffering a
significant decline.
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Id. at*4 n.5.  
At some point after a status
conference and filing of memoranda,
Morris conceded that he was no longer a
member of Local 115.   Accordingly, as
we have noted, the district court found that
since “[t]he parties agree that because
Plaintiff Morris is no longer a member of
the Local, he lacks standing to pursue a
claim with respect to temporary
trusteeship because such damages claim
would be limited to damages on behalf of
the Local.”  2002 WL 15900 at *3 (citing
Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, 266 F.3d
236, 249-250 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
Thereafter, the court certified only
the aforementioned question of Mack’s
and Fischer’s standing for interlocutory
appeal.  However, we need not answer the
certified question because we agree with
Hoffa that the district court erred by
splitting the challenge to the imposition of
the trusteeship into two separate claims. 
Under the plain language of § 464(c), the
district court’s holding on the validity of
the post-hearing maintenance trusteeship
necessarily established the validity of the
pre-hearing emergency trusteeship.
Therefore, Local 115 could not have
suffered any damages from the imposition
of the emergency trusteeship that was
continued following a fair hearing.
Section 304(c) of Title III of the
LMRDA provides, in relevant part:
In any proceeding pursuant
to this section a trusteeship
established by a labor
organization in conformity
with  the procedura l
requ ireme n t s  o f  i t s
constitution and bylaws and
authorized or ratified after a
fair hearing either before
the executive board or
before such other body as
may be provided in
accordance wi th  i t s
constitution or bylaws shall
be presumed valid for a
period of eighteen months
from the date of its
establishment and shall not
be subject to attack during
such period except upon
clear and convincing proof
that the trusteeship was not
established or maintained in
good faith for a purpose
allowable under section 462
of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (italics added). 
“Because the Act provides that a
trusteeship may be ‘authorized or ratified
after a fair hearing,’. . ., a hearing meeting
the requirements of the Act need not
always precede the imposition of a
trusteeship.” Becker, 900 F.2d at 769
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (italics in
Id. at 15 n.8.   However, they never made
this damages allegation in the district
court, and it has therefore been waived.
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original).  Accordingly, “[p]ost hoc
ratification of a trusteeship is consistent
with the Act so long as the union’s
constitution provides for such a process,
the ratification hearing otherwise meets
the requirements of the Act, and the
hearing follows the imposition of a
trusteeship with reasonable promptness.”
Id. (citations omitted). 
The district court found that “the
post-hearing trusteeship meets the
requirements of § 464(c) and is entitled to
the statutory presumption of validity.”
2001 WL 1231741 at *6.  That
presumption was not rebutted.  The plain
language of § 464(c) therefore compels a
finding that the emergency trusteeship was
valid.  Section 464(c) expressly requires
the presumption of validity of the
trusteeship be effective “for a period of
eighteen months from the date of its
establishment.”  It also provides that the
trusteeship “shall not be subject to attack
during such period.”  Consequently, the
eighteen month period of validity of the
trusteeship cannot be construed to begin at
the conclusion of the ratification hearing
or at any time other than “the date of its
establishment.”  
Here, the eighteen month period
began on November 15, 1999, when Hoffa
imposed the emergency trusteeship, and
under the statute, it was not subject to
attack during such time period. Therefore,
Mack and Fischer are barred from
bringing any action for damages on behalf
of Local Union 115 for violations of Title
III for 18 months following that date.  
In opposing Hoffa’s appeal, Mack
and Fischer ignore the fact that the plain
language of  § 464(c) validates the pre-
hearing emergency trusteeship absent
sufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption of validity.   Instead, they
argue that we cannot reach the validity of
the pre-hearing trusteeship without
improperly expanding the question
certified for interlocutory appeal beyond
the issue of standing. We disagree. 
“Although the scope of review on
an interlocutory appeal is generally
constrained to the questions certified for
review by the district court, we may
consider any grounds justifying reversal.”
Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin,
P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1245 (3d Cir. 1994)
(italics added).   Moreover, “appellate
jurisdiction [under § 1292(b)] applies to
the order certified to the court of appeals
and is not tied to the particular question
formulated by the district court.”  Yamaha
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199,
205 (1996).   Therefore, while we cannot
“reach beyond the certified order to
address other orders made in the case,” we
can “address any issue fairly included
within the certified order.”  Id. (italics
added).  Here, our conclusion that §
464(c) necessitates a finding that the
emergency trusteeship is valid is fairly
included within the certified question of
plaintiffs’ standing to pursue a Title III
claim for the period of the emergency
trusteeship.27   
27 We commend the district court
on its handling of this complex and hotly
26
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, we
will affirm the district court’s grant of
final judgment under Rule 54(b) on Count
Two to Hoffa and against the Morris
Plaintiffs,  However, we will vacate the
district court’s Rule 54(b) final judgments
on Count One and remand with directions
that the district court enter summary
judgment on Count One in favor of Hoffa
and against the Morris Plaintiffs. We will
also remand for disposition of Count
Three of the complaint.28
                         
contested dispute, and on the precision
and thoroughness of nearly all of its legal
analysis.  We disagree only with the
court’s decision to split Count One into
two separate claims.  
28In Count Three, the Morris
Plaintiffs alleged that Hoffa and the IBT
violated the IBT Constitution by imposing
the emergency trusteeship over Local 115
in the absence of any colorable
emergency, in violation of the LMRDA,
29 U.S.C. § 185.    In Count One, they
challenged the imposition of the
emergency trusteeship on the grounds that
it violated both Title III of the LMRDA
and the IBT Constitution.  In discussing
Count One in its summary judgment
opinion, the district court noted that, “[t]he
provisions in the IBT constitution
governing trusteeships closely track those
in the LMRDA.”  2001 WL 1231741 at
*3.  Therefore, it may well be that nothing
remains of the Count Three claim given
our holding that summary judgment
should be granted to Hoffa and against the
Morris Plaintiffs on the Count One claim.
However, this is best resolved by the
district court.
